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This article explores the rise of new conflicts of sovereignty especially with regard to 
popular sovereignty in the EU polity. It asks whether referenda in the national realm are 
effective tools to enhance popular sovereignty at supranational level. To elucidate this 
question, we distinguish between embedded and unilateral referenda. Empirically, the 
paper focuses on the referendum called by the Greek government on 
the proposed Memorandum of Understanding in 2015. While ambiguous from the 
outset, the referendum turned out to be of an embedded nature and failed to enhance 
popular sovereignty. Based on elite interviews and analysis of the discussion in the 
media, our analysis shows that the referendum was envisaged by the Greek government 
instrumentally to put pressure on the other negotiating parties and tackle internal party 
disagreements. This turned out to be self-defeating strategy ignoring the popular 
mandate and failing to improve the conditions for financial assistance.  





This paper addresses the common puzzle of the special issue, namely that of 
increasingly ubiquitous conflicts of sovereignty in the European Union (EU). More 
specifically, we seek to assess to what extent referenda are useful tools to enhance 
popular sovereignty in the EU. From the ‘no demos’ thesis to the literature in political 
sociology addressing the weakness of participatory mechanisms in the EU, most 
contributions point to a deficit of citizens’ involvement and the autonomization of 
bureaucratic elites from popular demands. Recently, political theorists promoting a 
demoicratic vision of the EU have nevertheless contended that the absence of a uniform 
European demos did not doom the EU; rather, they see that the various demoi of Europe 
should be able to exert jointly their inalienable but also necessarily mutually limiting 
sovereignty (Cheneval and Nicolaidis 2017). Against this theoretical background, there 
is little research on which institutional devices could enable such a demoicratic vision 
of the EU to restore popular sovereignty at supranational level. A separate string of 
research has analysed the increasingly frequent use of referenda over EU matters. 
Referenda are widely regarded as the tool par excellence allowing the people’s direct 
involvement in national democracies. Yet, the research on EU related referenda has 
nevertheless remained disconnected from the normative debates about popular 
sovereignty in the EU. Bringing these two lines of scholarship together, we ask to what 
extent national referenda on EU matters are effective in strengthening popular 
sovereignty. To elucidate this question, we distinguish between what we call unilateral 
and embedded referenda. A unilateral referendum concerns an issue which can be 
settled by one people (or demos) alone such as membership or opt-outs. In contrast, an 
embedded referendum asks a question about an issue which cannot be decided by one 
people only like in the case of treaty ratification and more specific policy issues.  
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Adopting a hypothesis building – rather than hypothesis testing – approach, we 
illustrate our argument with an investigation of the 2015 Greek referendum on the EU 
bail out agreement based on the specific literature on Greek politics, press reports and a 
series of 10 interviews conducted with decision makers in Athens and Brussels. We find 
that the nature of the referendum called by Alexis Tsipras was at the outset ambivalent 
but turned out to be an embedded referendum. Since neither the government nor the 
Greeks favoured a Grexit, the referendum was (mis)used instrumentally by the Prime 
Minister to enhance his negotiating position in the European talks and internally in his 
political party, a self-defeating strategy which ended up both ignoring the popular 
mandate and failing to improve the conditions for financial assistance. 
The first section of the article connects the literature over sovereignty in the EU with the 
research dealing with referenda over EU matters. The second section outlines our 
analytical framework in terms of unilateral vs. embedded referenda. The third section 
shows which difficulties George Papandreou faced in a first attempt to call a 
referendum in 2011, while the fourth section explains why the referendum called by 
Alexis Tsipras in 2015 failed to enhance popular sovereignty. A final section draws the 
conclusions from our case study and discusses the further insights related to conflicts of 
sovereignty.  
Popular sovereignty and referenda in the EU 
As argued in the introduction to this special issue, the original focus between nation-
state sovereignty vs. supranationalism at EU level has given way to a much more 
complex debate. Following the end of De Gaulle’s empty chair politics and of 
Thatcher’s veto strategy, the objective has been to understand the workings and 
implications of ‘pooled’ (Peterson 1997) or ‘shared sovereignty’ (Wallace 1999) among 
states. Over time, though, scholars from various research traditions have pointed to 
4 
 
deficits regarding other forms of sovereignty, as EU integration ostensibly trumped 
national parliaments’ prerogatives as well as the principle of popular sovereignty. 
Against this background, a relatively recent scholarship promoting demoicracy has tried 
to reconcile Europe wide democracy with popular sovereignty. Demoicratic scholars 
claim that, to work in a way which places popular sovereignty at the heart of 
democracy, the EU does not need one single unified demos. Rather, a European 
democracy could and should be grounded in the recognition of the plurality of the 
various European demoi. A European demoicracy can therefore be defined as a ‘union 
of peoples who govern together but not as one’ (Cheneval and Schimmelfenning 2013). 
  From the perspective of sovereignty, this means that national sovereignties 
derived from the national demoi do not need to be merged, pooled, or shared, but that 
they need to be exerted jointly. As Cheneval and Nicolaidis (2017) explain, there are 
two sides of the exercise of joint sovereignty in a demoicracy. On the one hand, the fact 
that the various people remain distinct implies that they preserve the control over 
decisions concerning the constitutive rules of the game: ‘They remain sovereign as long 
as these rules are revocable, as long as sovereigns can formally exit the system or veto 
the change of the constitutive rules. This feature, we believe, is the most basic principle 
underlying a demoicratic order’ (2017, 244). At the same time, though, those distinct 
popular sovereigns necessarily limit each other in their respective capacity to make 
decisions: ‘Joint demoicratic sovereignty is thus a legal disability of the sovereign 
peoples. It constitutionally constrains them not to perform certain acts of sovereignty 
alone but only in accord with all the other members of the polity of demoi’ (2017, 241). 
While the concept of demoicracy proposes an interesting path for restoring the role of 




In relation with the EMU, Cheneval and Nicolaidis write that ‘the so called 
rules-based system created by EMU cannot simply be remedied by handing over more 
sovereignty to a common institution. Instead, shared sovereignty needs to be exercised 
at all levels of interaction between peoples sharing a common currency.’ (2017, 248).  
But how can this be done in practice? National parliaments are often invoked as a 
channel for strengthening national publics’ voice in the EU (Beetz and Risso 2017, 41). 
Yet, the strengthening of national parliaments, for instance through the early warning 
mechanism, has done little to enhance the linkage between citizens and EU decision 
making (Christiansen et al. 2014). Given that referenda are considered as the most 
direct and effective tool for requiring popular expression, it is surprising that they have 
not been discussed as a potential tool for strengthening popular sovereignty and a 
demoicratic vision of the EU.  
The shift from the Economic Community to the political Union triggered 
contentious political debates in the founding Member States, which marked the end of 
the so-called permissive consensus whereby national elites were enjoying large 
autonomy to make decisions over EU integration. Out of 46 referenda on EU issues 
called since 1972, only 8 were held before Maastricht. Even though this can be partly 
explained by the enlargement dynamic of the EU, this trend has also been driven by the 
rise of Eurosceptic parties seeking to exploit EU matters politically. From a substantial 
point of view, the nature of the questions submitted to referenda has diversified over 
time. 
As underlined by Mendez et al. (2014), there are two main approaches to 
referenda over EU matters. On the one hand, legal and institutional studies have focused 
on the various constitutional arrangements. One aspect relates to why governments 
decide to organise referenda, namely either because of the constitutional necessity to 
6 
 
increase ensure sufficient legitimacy for a decision in the EU realm or for strategic 
reasons (asserting one’s position in the domestic or EU political game) (Beach 2018). 
Another aspect deals with the implications ranging from non-bindings referenda, to 
second votes or extra-territorial effects for the EU as a whole (Hug 2002). These 
approaches therefore concentrate on explaining referenda determinants at system level.  
On the other hand, a more behavioural body of research has examined individual 
determinants and sought to explain referenda outcomes in terms of a majority of citizens 
approving or rejecting the issue submitted. A main question has been to determine 
whether, when voting in an EU related referendum, citizens are expressing their opinion 
on the EU matter at stake or whether their voting behaviour is mostly driven by factors 
related to domestic politics. In the mid-1990s, Franklin et al. (1995) argued that the 
‘second order election’ model could be applied to referenda in the EU. Ten years later, 
de Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) found that anti-immigration sentiments, evaluations 
of the economic situation and opinions on the domestic government are consistently the 
strongest predictors of voting in an EU referendum. Other scholars have argued that EU 
referenda were following and issue-voting model whereby voters do position 
themselves on the EU issue at stake (Hoboldt 2009). Moreover, several studies show 
that campaign dynamics can have decisive effects (de Vreese 2007). A few scholars 
have attempted to understand referenda in a two-level game perspective thus looking at 
the implications from the point of view of governments (Hug and König 2002) but their 
broader implications for democratic legitimacy, let alone popular sovereignty, have 
remained unexplored. 
Unilateral vs. embedded referenda 
In this section, we try to  assess whether and how referenda can contribute to enhance 
popular sovereignty. To do this, we build on a classical typology distinguishes between 
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three types of referenda1 dealing with a) accession, b) treaty ratification and c) policy 
issues (Shu, 2008, Mendez 2014, EP 2017). However, this typology fpocuses on the 
objects of referenda rather than their outcomes. Because we are interested in separate 
yet mutually dependent popular sovereignties in the EU, we need to look at the effects 
of referenda both in the domestic polities and in the EU polity as a whole. Adopting the 
point of view of joint sovereignty, it is key to understand whether referenda allow the 
several European demoi to exert their sovereignty in full autonomy or whether, on the 
contrary, they are constrained by the sovereignty of other demoi in the EU. In the 
following pages, we proceed to a brief review of the different types of referendum 
which took place and consider their practical implications in terms of policy outcomes, 
conflict and legitimacy. On this basis, we argue for the need to refine the existing 
typologies  with an additional two-fold distinction between unilateral and embedded 
referenda.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Membership referenda seem to have the most straight forward implications since 
no accession referendum, whether positive or negative (for instance the 1972 failed 
accession referendum in Norway), has been contested. Due to its unprecedented nature, 
the Brexit referendum features as an exception. The referendum results have been hotly 
discussed and, with the negotiations still on-going, their possible ramifications are 
beyond the reach of this paper (see Bickerton in this issue). Hence, membership 
                                                 
1 Since we are interested in popular sovereignty in the EU polity, we do not consider referenda 
over EU matters in third countries.  
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referenda reflect well the type of constitutive issues requiring sovereign decisions made 
by the European peoples as discussed by Cheneval and Nicolaidis. 
The same arguably holds for referendum over opt-outs. The Danish and Swedish 
outcomes on the Euro have not brought about any contestation. Similarly, those 
countries who have chosen to opt-out from specific policy areas (such as Justice and 
Home Affairs for Denmark) have seemed relatively happy with their choice, also given 
that more flexible arrangements (such as ad hoc opt ins) have been made possible. The 
2015 referendum asking for a possible abolishment of this opt-out furthermore shows 
that a re-assertion of the popular will is always possible. Although their legitimizing 
effects are not always straight forward, exit referenda (exit from the EU or opt-out) give 
national governments credit for consulting the population and, on the other hand, shape 
the EU as a union of the good will in which peoples’ voice can be heard. The 
commonality between both types of referendum is that they rest on a decision made by 
one particular national demos where other European demoi have no influence except the 
passive recognition of its democratic hence legitimate nature. We therefore categorize 
these referenda as unilateral referenda.  
In contrast, the situation is very different for referenda over treaty ratifications 
and more specific policy issues. This is because the effects of such decisions cannot 
depend on the sovereign decision of one demos alone. History has shown that referenda 
over treaty ratification have strengthened popular sovereignty when they were positive 
but things become much more complicated when a majority of citizens voted ‘no’. 
From the theoretical standpoint of democratic principles, if one considers that individual 
demoi should be asked for approval, the rejection of a treaty by referendum should 
result in stopping the envisaged revision. Yet, European leaders have not proven willing 
to let a long-negotiated treaty suddenly disappear in the archives of history when only a 
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small minority of European citizens failed to ratify it. In Ireland, the fact that such 
ratification referenda are legally required seems to do little to enhance popular 
sovereignty. The 2001 referendum on the Treaty of Nice was the first to fail with a very 
low turnout (35%). The main outcome was to simply ask the citizens to vote a second 
time on the exact same treaty the following year whereby a majority could be achieved 
but with a turnout still below 50%. The 2005 referendum over the European 
Constitutional Treaty seems to have had even more disastrous effects from the point of 
view of popular sovereignty. The negative referenda in France and the Netherlands 
brought about major political turmoil and as they were a clear expression of popular 
discontent with the EU. And yet, the Lisbon Treaty which eventually entered into force 
in 2009 was only a marginally altered version of the former treaty stripped of the 
symbolic constitutional references. To circumvent the possible difficulties implied by 
popular ratification, the route of parliamentary ratification was chosen in both countries. 
This series of events have remained important – almost traumatic – milestones in the 
political life of those countries as an episode epitomizing the denial of democracy rather 
than the strengthening of popular sovereignty in EU politics. Meanwhile, the Irish had 
again to vote a second time after a first failed attempt to ratify the Lisbon treaty, 
showing that no lessons had been drawn from Nice. All this gives us good empirical 
grounds to argue that, contrary to what conventional wisdom would suggest, ratification 
referenda have remained (at least so far) dependent on political process with 
ramifications going much further than the national setting in which they take place. 
Insofar, should be considered as embedded rather than unilateral. 
The recent history of the EU provides four cases of referenda over more specific 
policy issues. The Danish referendum on membership to the European Patent Court 
(2014), the Greek referendum on the bailout (2015), the Dutch referendum on the EU-
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Ukraine Association Agreement and the Hungarian referendum on the EU refugee 
quotas (2016). The first was organised at the same time as the EP election and resulted 
favourably, therefore being unproblematic. In both the Dutch and Hungarian cases, 
none of the referendum results could possibly make a difference in the EU’s policies. 
The EU was clearly not going to change the quotas adopted as a result of the Hungarian 
referendum. While the position of Orban was approved by 98% of the voters, the low 
turnout (40, 4%) was insufficient to pass the 50% hurdle required by the Hungarian 
constitution for the result to be valid, therefore turning it to a non-success for the 
President. In the Dutch case, the EU-Ukraine agreement entered into force provisionally 
in spite of the referendum result in January 2016 and the Dutch parliamentarians 
eventually ratified it in April 2016. Thus, this type of referendum, too, should be seen as 
embedded.  
Τhis preliminary assessment of the effects ensuing from referenda over EU 
matters provides good grounds for a) distinguishing between unilateral and embedded 
and b) hypothesizing that, when dealing with issues which cannot be settled by a 
unilateral decision made by one people only, referenda are not an effective tool for 
enhancing popular sovereignty in the EU. The next section turns to an in-depth 
examination of the 2015 Greek referendum as an illustration supporting this hypothesis. 
This case is particularly interesting because it is located in a grey area between 
unilateral and embedded referenda: behind the issue of the bail out terms, the issue of a 
possible Grexit from the Euro area loomed, creating ambiguity and different 
understandings of the referendum’s purpose and possible implications 
 
The 2011 Greek governments’ attempt to call a referendum 
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The Eurozone crisis which started in 2009 and its impact upon Greece is a telling case 
for exploring the limits of popular sovereignty via the use of referenda. Although the 
2015 referendum is one of the most crucial events during the Greek crisis, it was the 
Prime Minister George Papandreou in 2011 who first proposed the conduct of a 
referendum. Although it was initiated as a referendum over a specific policy issue (the 
2011 bailout agreement), Papandreou was immediately pushed to turn it to a 
membership of the Eurozone referendum or cancel it all together. In line with our 
argument it is shown that the EU partners preferred a membership referendum with 
implications mainly for Greece rather than a referendum upon a policy issue which 
would imply effects for other demoi. Examining the two successive episodes (2011 
attempt to call a referendum and 2015 referendum) allows us to compare two separate 
instances in the same domestic environment during the same European crisis to use a 
referendum in order to enhance popular sovereignty. Both instances were unsuccessful 
for similar reasons as it is further discussed. 
By 2011, the increase in public debt in combination with the country's recession 
since 2008 resulted in the Greek economy being the weakest link in the Eurozone and 
thus heavily affected by the 2008 financial crisis, which ultimately required the use of 
an international support mechanism in order to avoid a default. In May of 2010 the First 
Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was agreed.  It was the result of strenuous 
negotiations both domestically and internationally since this was the first time that such 
a programme was agreed stretching the no bailout clause of the Lisbon Treaty for the 
Eurozone.  The necessary economic adjustment and the austerity measures put forward 
as a result of the first programme put a lot of strain on the Greek political system and 
society. There was no consensus for the necessity of the programme and subsequent 
strikes and demonstrations were taking place during the first year of the 
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implementation. A cleavage between memorandum and anti-memorandum supporters 
emerged with the opposition, including the conservative New Democracy (ND), united 
behind an anti-memorandum rhetoric. In September of 2011 the Greek economy was 
still not trusted by international rating agencies and the crisis was slowly spreading to 
other Eurozone member-states. It was soon clear that a new Programme would be 
necessary together with some type of debt relief. After tough negotiations with the 
banks and the EU partners a new Programme followed by a Private Sector Involvement 
(PSI) for debt restructuring was agreed in Brussels in October of 2011. Although this 
was an important achievement given the circumstances, the reactions back home were 
negative.  The climate was tense and violent incidents against the President of the 
Democracy, the Prime Minister and MPs were erupting with every opportunity such as 
the annual commemoration of the end of the German occupation. 
This was the first time that an attempt was made to call a referendum in Greece during 
the crisis.  On the 31st of October 2011 George Papandreou announced his willingness 
to call a referendum on the decision reached in Brussels a few days ago. He stated: “In 
these circumstances, the citizen has the first act and the first word. A dominant role 
without other mediators… For the new agreement, we should hold a referendum. The 
Greek people and each citizen separately should decide… We believe in citizens, we 
believe in their judgment, we believe in their decision” (Papakonstantinou 2016, 299). 
Both domestically and internationally the call for a referendum caused 
turbulence and Papandreou was soon forced to cancel it and resign. Domestically, the 
referendum aimed in pushing the opposition to a compromise since a vote against the 
agreement would most probably lead Greece to a default and to an exit from the 
Eurozone (Papandreou, 2015). Internationally, the markets immediately reacted by 
further downgrading the Greek economy since they show the referendum as a sign of 
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instability and uncertainty. The European leaders were not supportive either. 
Papandreou had discussed his intention to hold a referendum with Chancellor Merkel 
and EU officials such as Jose Manuel Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker and Herman Van 
Rompuy but not with President Sarkozy. Although no one could openly object 
Papandreou’s decision there was a lot of uneasiness and Sarkozy suggested to 
Papandreou to ask a clear question to the people: yes or no to the Euro 
(Papakonstantinou 2016). The news spread instantly and a frenzy about a possible 
Grexit started in the international media increasing the pressure toward the Greek 
government (Dinas and Rori 2013). 
The support for the referendum soon evaporated even internally in the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) with the Minister of Finance Evangelos 
Venizelos denouncing the idea. This was the last nail in the coffin and Papandreou was 
forced to resignation. A new transitional government under the technocrat and ex 
European Central Bank (ECB) vice-chair Lucas Papademos took the lead in order to 
implement the agreement and the PSI and lead the country to elections.  It was 
supported by a party coalition between PASOK, ND and the Popular Radical Rally 
(LAOS).  The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was signed in 
February of 2012.   
To conclude, the proposed Papandreou referendum was envisaged as a strategic 
referendum in order to assert the government’s position at the domestic political game 
regarding the second bailed-out agreement and the PSI agreed in Brussels in October 
2011. In Papandreou’s words: “… a referendum, would have forced opposition parties 
to take a clear stance on whether they were for or against the programme and they 
would then have to live up to their position” (Papandreou, 2015: 256).  Although it was 
presented as a referendum over a specific policy issue (the bailout agreement), the EU’s 
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reaction was such that it soon looked that it could turn to a membership of the Eurozone 
referendum. It could be argued that the EU partners preferred an EMU membership 
referendum which would mainly have implications for Greece rather than a referendum 
upon a policy issue which would imply effects for other demoi and not for Greece 
alone. Although technically EMU membership falls into the opt out category of 
referenda, there was a great risk both in 2011 and in 2015 that Grexit from the EMU 
would ultimately lead to an exit from the EU.  This supports our claim that referenda are 
not an effective tool for enhancing popular sovereignty when they concern a decision 
which will affect other EU member states and not only the demos that is called to vote. 
Of course, at this particular time even a Grexit vote over such a question would have 
affected the rest of the Eurozone countries and certainly the other peripheral member 
states. This made such an exercise even less desirable.         
 
The 2015 referendum: the instrumental use of an embedded referendum 
The 2015 referendum over the bail-out agreement that was negotiated by the newly 
elected coalition government formed by the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) and 
the rightwing party of the Independent Greeks (ANEL) is one of the most memorable 
events of the Greek crisis and definitely a referendum worth analyzing for the purposes 
of this article. Even classifying this referendum as a vote over a policy issue (bailout 
agreement) or over Eurozone-EU membership is contested since different actors framed 
the referendum differently. It is argued here that the government attempted to use the 
referendum as a way out from a political deadlock reached by the negotiations at the 
European level but also at the domestic level since SYRIZA MPs were not ready to 
accept a new bailout agreement. However, the government’s strategy to present it as a 
policy issue referendum made it an embedded referendum. The government’s return to 
15 
 
the negotiations table despite the victory of the ‘No’ vote confirms our claim that 
referenda are not an effective tool for enhancing popular sovereignty when they concern 
a decision which will affect the rest of the EU (embedded referenda).  
In the early hours of the 27th of June 2015 the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras 
announced the first referendum in Greece since the establishment of democracy in 1974. 
The last referendum was constitutional and was conducted in July 1973 concerning the 
choice between constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy.  Referendum 
was never considered to be an option in the Greek political system since the 
Constitution explicitly states that referenda should only be held in extraordinary cases 
of non-predictable emergency (Hellenic Republic, article 44).  The referendum took 
place on the 5th of July 2015, just one week after its announcement. A number of 
peculiarities characterize the preparation and tackling of the result.   
To put things into context, a SYRIZA led coalition government has been in 
power since January 2015. SYRIZA was the winner of the January 2015 elections by 
increasing its power points by 9.5% and gathering the total of 36.3% of the vote. It 
formed a government together with ANEL promising to ‘tear up the Memoranda’ and 
renegotiate the loan agreement. The internal political debate during this period was 
reduced to a memorandum/ anti-memorandum cleavage which was occasionally shifted 
to a Euro versus ‘return to a national currency’ cleavage. The crisis in Greece was 
increasingly framed as a ‘war’ with European partners and especially the Germans as 
the ‘enemy’ or the ‘occupying force’ (Dinas and Rori, 2013; Lowen 2015). The choice 
of Yianis Varoufakis as Minister of Finance and leader of the negotiations with the 
troika (symbolically renamed by the new government as ‘Institutions’) increased the 
tension and led to a period of very harsh negotiations, full of symbolic moves such as 
the transfer of the meetings from the Ministries at Hilton Athens. International media 
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were closely following the events since this was the first ‘radical’ left government in 
Europe and Varoufakis was a theatrical figure adding to the dramatization of events. 
This period lasted from January until June 2015 when the negotiations reached a 
deadlock.    
The eight days between the announcement of the referendum and the vote 
consist one of the most condensed political times in the history of modern Greece. The 
emotions were intense, the events were speedy, and the stakes were high. It is telling 
that when the referendum was announced EU officials participating in the negotiations 
thought that the government was holding the referendum in order to support the 
agreement (Interview 6). There was not enough time to neither properly consider issues 
about the constitutionality of the referendum nor debate and campaign. The Constitution 
does not allow for referenda on fiscal matters but the government quickly answered that 
the matter was not fiscal and it fell under the ‘crucial national matters’ category 
(Tsatsanis and Teperoglou 2016).  Rori (2016) summarises a number of institutional 
aspects that made the preparation of this referendum questionable. The question was 
complex and the two draft documents of the agreement that the people were asked to 
vote for were of a technical character. Even more these documents were not the latest 
drafts since the Greek side left the negotiations and the EU partners declared that there 
was no agreement on the table any longer. Paradoxically, the ‘No’ vote was placed 
before the ‘Yes’ on the ballot paper.   
The institutional flaws weakened the credibility of the upcoming referendum but 
the single most important event was the bank holiday and capital controls imposed by 
the government as a reaction to the ECB’s decision not to raise the ceiling of the 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). The political uncertainty led to an increasing 
deposit outflow which in combination with the freezing of the ELA meant that the 
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banking system was close to collapse and capital controls was the only way to avoid a 
bank run. (Interview 9). The downside was that important practical problems 
immediately occurred such as the potential shortage of medicines and of raw materials 
necessary for the domestic production of everyday goods (Interview 4). Although 
government officials praise the handling of a very difficult situation (Interview 5) it has 
been shown that capital controls did affect the voting behavior of people. 12.3% of all 
voters switched to a Yes-vote because of the bank shutdown and the uncertainty caused 
by it (Walter, Dinas, Jurado and Konstantinidis, 2018). The imminent expiration of the 
current bail-out agreement on the 30th of June, the refusal of the lenders to provide an 
extension requested by the government in light of the referendum and the 1.5 billion 
euro payment to the IMF that was due immediately, meant that default was looming. 
Τhe one-week campaign was tensed and polarized. The country was divided into 
two camps that were passionately campaigning against each other and no room for 
debate and meaningful discussion was left. The governing coalition partners SYRIZA 
and ANEL as well as the right-wing extremist Golden Dawn (HA) were fiercely against 
the bail-out while the pro-European parties ND, PASOK, Democratic Left (DIMAR) 
and the River (POTAMI) were united in their campaign in favor of the agreement. What 
is interesting when trying to classify the 2015 referendum is that the two sides of the 
campaign framed the question differently and the framing itself was in the centre of the 
campaign.  The ‘No’ campaign was saying that the referendum was a powerful 
negotiation weapon that would empower the Prime Minister. It was about national pride 
and dignity and it was not about the currency or Eurozone membership. ‘The 
referendum was presented as an opportunity to assess democracy and popular 
sovereignty, according to SYRIZA, or national sovereignty according to ANEL and 
HA.’ (Rori, 2016: 12).  On the other side, the ‘Yes’ supporters framed the referendum 
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as a vote towards Greece’s membership in the Eurozone and potentially the EU and 
described the referendum as an existential threat and the ‘No’ vote as a suicide.   
Although the campaign was short it quickly moved beyond the borders of 
Greece with European leaders, officials and international economists taking positions. 
Quite paradoxical if we assume that referenda are supposed to enhance popular 
sovereignty and not to provoke international ‘interventions’. Similarly, to the domestic 
division, the international discussion was also split into two camps. The first camp 
consisted of EU leaders and EU officials who directly or indirectly warned Greece that 
a ‘No’ vote would most likely lead to Grexit. On the 29th of June, just one day after the 
announcement of the referendum, President Juncker held a press conference where he 
called the Greek people to vote ‘Yes’.  He stated: ‘If the Greek people, acting 
responsibly and conscious of the national and European role they are playing, vote 
‘yes’, the message to the other members of the eurozone, the European Union as a 
whole and the wider world is that Greece wants to remain with the other members of the 
eurozone and the European Union’ (European Commission, 29-6-16). Most other EU 
leaders avoided suggesting to the Greek people what to vote but made statements that a 
‘No’ vote would most likely signify an exit from the Eurozone. For instance, on the 29th 
of June such statements came from the UK Prime Minister Cameron, from Chancellor 
Merkel and her Economy Minister Gabriel and from Italy’s Prime Minister Renzi 
(Frazer, 29-6-15). The second camp comprised from prominent economists and opinion 
makers quite a few of them based in the US, such as Stiglitz, Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs 
and Wolfgang Munchau. They were often (but not at all times) campaigning for a 
Grexit and urging the Greek people to vote ‘No’. A good example of this campaign is 
Joseph Stiglitz’, a Nobel laureate in economics, article titled ‘How I would vote in the 
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Greek referendum’ (2015) where he stated that a no vote paved the way to a brighter 
future for the Greeks.  
The result of the vote was 61.31% ‘No’ and 38.69% ‘Yes’. Void and blank votes 
were 5.80 (Ministry of Interior).  This clear victory for Alexis Tsipras and the 
government had unexpected consequences.  Free from his provocative Minister of 
Finance, Yianis Varoufakis, and with the people on his side rather than acting upon the 
‘No’ vote in a dramatic way that could lead the country out of the Eurozone, he returned 
to the negotiations table. Varoufakis (2017) describes the atmosphere after the ‘No’ vote 
at Maximou (the Prime Minister’s residence) as an atmosphere of electoral defeat rather 
than victory. The Euro Summit of the 12th of July was the last act in the drama.  The 
negotiations lasted 17 hours and what Tsipras was faced with was a very tough line 
from the European partners.  The German Finance Minister Schäuble brought on the 
table a five-year exit plan from the Eurozone and a Luxembourg-based trust fund 
authorized to sell off Greek state assets. Greece found itself marginalized without many 
allies and it was mainly the French delegation that acted as mediator between the 
Greeks and the rest of Europe (Interview 4). The outcome of this meeting was 
ultimately more balanced. A third 86 billion euros bailout programme for the next three 
years was agreed. Fiscal adjustment and structural reforms supervised by the 
Institutions remained in place. It is difficult even for government officials to argue that 
the referendum brought some direct benefits for Greece. One Minister argued that it 
helped Alexis Tsipras to be accepted by his European counterparts as the key negotiator 
(Interview 3). Most of them claim that the fiscal package was improved but the 
structural reform conditionality remained more or less the same. An attempt was made 
to add a parallel programme with policies that the government wanted to pursue but of 
course it had to be in line with the conditionality agreed (Interviews 2 and 10). The 
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political developments were also significant since one-third of SYRIZA’s MPs came 
into direct conflict with the government and resigned. Tsipras called for an early 
election on the 20th of September and managed to renew his power in a new coalition 
government with ANEL and with less of an internal opposition.  Possible, the most 
tangible political result of the referendum.    
The 2015 referendum was a tactical referendum and not a referendum aiming at 
enhancing popular sovereignty. Most government officials have described it as a 
negotiation tool and this was also Alexis Tsipras’ line who argued that if the ‘No’ camp 
wins he will be in a stronger position to negotiate a more favorable deal (Rori, 2016, 
Interviews 2, 4 and 5). The difference was that some government officials saw it as one 
more negotiation tool that would eventually lead to an agreement (i.e. Interview 7) 
while others saw it as a nuclear weapon that could even lead to conflict with the 
European partners and even to Grexit (i.e. Interviews 1 and 8). It was also described as a 
relief valve in order for a new balance to be achieved and the party to be able to move 
forward (Interview 7) or as an emergency exit (Varoufakis, 2017: 724-25). Very few 
refer to the necessity for the people to express their will beyond the negotiations game 
and as a tool aiming to strengthen their democratic expression (Interview 3; Varoufakis, 
2017 and Stiglitz, 29-6-15). Classifying the 2015 referendum presents similar problems 
to the classification of the referendum proposed by Papandreou.  Although it was 
presented as a referendum over a specific policy issue (the bail-out agreement), EU 
leaders, the opposition and the left wing of SYRIZA among others conceived it as a 
Grexit referendum. Even if it didn’t eventually lead to Grexit, the No vote brought the 
country closer than ever. The fact that an agreement was reached at the last minute 
supports our claim that referenda are not an effective tool for enhancing popular 
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sovereignty when they concern a decision which will affect other EU member states and 
not only the demos that is called to vote.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The Greek experience with referenda during the Eurozone crisis years shows that the 
relationship between referenda and popular sovereignty is not straight forward. It has 
been clearly shown that embedded referenda such as the ratification of bailed-out 
agreements which depend on the action of other governments and other demoi do not 
serve to enhance popular sovereignty when they are negative. In the 2011 case, 
Papandreou was discouraged and advised to call a clear exit referendum both by 
domestic and international actors and eventually pulled back. In the 2015 case, the 
referendum took place but the government never enacted upon the ‘No’ vote. What is 
common in both cases is that the reasons behind the referenda were instrumental and 
had very little to do with the ‘voice’ of the people. Surely, the initial discourse was 
about popular sovereignty, but the rationale was to use the popular verdict in support of 
the leaders’ political goals. Whether a clear exit referendum in either 2011 or 2015 
would have generated legitimizing effects and thus enhanced popular sovereignty 
remains a hypothetical question. Our analysis taps into the debate about conflicts of 
sovereignty addressed in this special issue. More specifically, it brings insights with 
regard to which kind of institutional mechanisms, e.g. national referenda, can serve to 
exert the kind of joint popular sovereignty the proponents of demoicracy call for. It can 
be argued that in the case of Greece during the Eurozone crisis, turning to referenda 
further enhanced conflicts of sovereignty rather than boosting popular sovereignty and 
thus contributing to the realization of demoicracy in Europe. 
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Drawing from the case study, we can outline a number of conflicts of 
sovereignty, both in the national and European realm, which could not be alleviated by 
the referendum or were even triggered by it. A first conflict was the one between 
popular and parliamentary sovereignty. In the case of the 2015 referendum the 
Parliament was further weakened and the executive was strengthened. The institutional 
flaws of the 2015 referendum such as the question about the constitutionality of the 
referendum, the short time span of the campaign and the vagueness of the actual 
question meant that the parliament was totally inactive during this period. Individual 
MPs tried to make their voices heard but there was no institutional involvement in the 
debate. To the contrary, the dramatization of the events before and after the referendum 
forced the opposition to vote in favor of the bailed-out agreement together with the 
government and led 25 SYRIZA MPs to resign from the party and become independent. 
The big winner was Alexis Tsipras who was re-elected on the 20th of September and 
renewed his term of office for another four years. The 2015 referendum did not ease the 
conflict between state and supranational sovereignty either. Turning to the people did 
not offer Tsipras the negotiation weapon that he hoped for and ended up in even harsher 
negotiations. The signing of the third bailed-out agreement was applauded by European 
elites and the opposition but it certainly did not do any good to popular sovereignty or 
the referendum institution. Popular sovereignty was heart straight from the beginning 
with the numerous international interventions in favor or against the ‘no’ vote from 
people that were too far away from Greek or even European politics to be able to give 
an informed opinion or that were too powerful to be ignored. Similarly, in the case of 
Papandreou the referendum did not even occur, and he was forced to resign in light of 
the supranational as well as domestic pressure.            
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From a European politics point of view, the 2015 Greek referendum has 
contributed to fuel conflicts of sovereignty rather than to the exercise of demoicratic 
joint sovereignties in several respects. A first aspect of the 2015 referendum drama 
features a conflict between the Greek state sovereignty and the EU’s supranational 
sovereignty in the realm of monetary policy. This indicates the embedded nature of the 
referendum since the use of such a unilateral democratic tool cannot erase the 
interdependency due to the ECB’s exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy. 
In the run-up to the referendum, the bank refused to grant liquidity assistance, which led 
the government to announce a bank holiday and to impose capital controls in order to 
avoid massive capital outflow from the country.  This move by ECB can at least be 
interpreted as a defensive reaction from the EU institutions’ looking to preserve the 
integrity of the Euro area against disruptive events.  
A second dimension regards an unprecedented clash between state 
sovereignties. The negotiations which took place over 17 hours at the Eurogroup 
meeting on 16 July 2015 will remain in history books as one of the most brutal episodes 
of inter-state confrontation in the EU. Instead of increasing A. Tsipras negotiating 
power vis-à-vis other European leaders, it led him to confront a coalition of creditors, 
austerity minded countries, led by the inflexible German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble. An imminent Grexit was invoked as a threat to impose harshness in the form 
of, among others, far-reaching welfare cuts and the privatization of Greek public assets 
and infrastructures under the auspices of an international fund. Instead of managing 
interdependence among equally sovereign states, the Eurogroup has turned into a mere 
instrument of power games leaving the door open to interstate domination. 
This clash of state sovereignties reflects further conflicts of popular and 
parliamentary sovereignty among the European demoi. As noted by Hodson (2016), 
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‘the Greek crisis is a test of multiple democracies and Eurozone members were 
understandably reluctant to commit taxpayer’s money abroad without economic 
assurances and appropriate forms of political accountability’ (p. 154). For sure, 
Schäuble’s intransigent position did enjoy wide support among the German public and 
the same is true for representatives of the Netherlands, Finland or Austria. Rather than 
facilitating mutual understanding and joint solutions, the political escalation 
accompanying the referendum antagonized the different European demoi, especially the 
German and the Greek peoples (Sternberg et al. 2018). The featuring of Angela Merkel 
as a Nazi in the Greek public sphere and the dubbing of Greeks as liars and traitors in 
the German press are just shocking signs of the dangerous antagonizing spiral sparkled 
by the confrontation. 
A final aspect relates to the empowering of national parliaments in the EU 
polity. Many parliaments in the EU were granted the power to deliver their approval 
over the negotiations with Greece either ex ante or ex post or both, as for the German 
Bundestag. Looking at creditor countries, scholars found that those countries in which 
the parliaments could vote on the final agreement - namely Estonia, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Spain - turned out to be the hard liners in the negotiations with Greece 
(Moschella 2017). Thus, the legitimate expression of the Greek popular sovereignty was 
bound to clash with the legitimate expression of parliamentary sovereignty in other EU 
countries, therefore leaving national and European decision makers in a democratic 
deadlock. To conclude, while demoicracy is an appealing normative perspective for the 
future of the EU, it needs to pay more attention to the multiple conflicts of sovereignty 
which are built into the EU’s political system. Searching for institutional devices to 
concretely implement the exercise of joint popular sovereignty in the EU, the Greek 
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case illustrates in a paradigmatic way why unilateral national referenda seem to 
exacerbate rather than alleviate those conflicts.  
 
Bibliography 
Beetz, J.-P. And Risso, E. 2017. “The EU’s democratic deficit in a realist key: 
multilateral governance, popular sovereignty and critical responsiveness” Transnational 
Legal Theory 8(1): 22-41. 
Cheneval, F. and Schimmelfennig, F. 2013. “The case for Demoicracy in the European 
Union”. Journal of Common Market Studies 51(2): 334-350. 
Cheneval, F. and Nicolaidis, K. 2017. “The social construction of demoicracy in the 
European Union” European Journal of Political Theory 16(2):235-260. 
Christiansen, T., Högenauer, A.-L. and Neuhold, C. 2014 “National parliaments in the 
post-Lisbon European Union: bureaucratization rather than 
democratization?” Comparative European Politics 12: 121–40.Dinas, E. and Rori, L. 
2013. “The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear and Loathing in the Polls” West 
European Politics 36. 1: 270-282. 
European Parliament, Referendums on EU matters, Study, 2017. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/571402/IPOL_STU(2017)5
71402_EN.pdf  
Five President’s Report – Juncker, J.C., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M. and 
Schulz, M. 2015. “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”. Report 
issued on 22 June 2015. European Commission.  
Franklin, M. N., van der Eijk, C., & Marsh, M. 1995. Referendum outcomes and trust in 
government: Public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht. West European 
Politics 18(3): 101–117. 
26 
 
Frazer, I. 2015. “Greece Debt Crisis Live: EU Leaders Say the Referendum is a Choice 
between Euro and Drachma as Grexit Looms” The Telegraph available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/11705199/Greece-debt-crisis-Greek-banks-
pension-cuts-live.html 
Hellenic Republic. 2018. The Constitution of Greece, as revised by the Parliamentary 
Resolution of May 27th 2018. 
Hobolt, S. B. 2009. Europe in question: Referendums on European integration. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hodson, D. 2016. “Eurozone Governance: From the Greek Drama of 2015 to the Five 
Presidents’ Report” Journal of Common Market Studies 54: 150-166.  
Hug, S. 2002. Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums, and European 
Integration. Lanham. Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Hug, S. 2004. “Occurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums. A Theoretical 
Model and Empirical Evidence”. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16(3): 321–56.  
Hug, S. 2009. “Some Thoughts about Referendums, Representative Democracy, and 
Separation of Powers”. Constitutional Political Economy, 20(3–4): 251–66.  
Hug, S. and König, T. 2002. “In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and 
Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference” International 
Organization 56: 447–76.  
Lowen, M. 2015. “Why Did Greece’s Varoufakis bring up Nazis in Berlin?” BBC News. 
6/2/2015. 
Mendez, F. Mendez, M. and Triga, V. 2014. Referendums and the European Union. A 
Comparative Inquiry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ministry of the Interior, http://ekloges.ypes.gr (last visited 9/8/18) 
27 
 
Moschella, M. 2017. “When Some Are More Equal than Others: National Parliaments 
and Intergovernmental Bailout Negotiations in the Eurozone” Government and 
Opposition 52(2): 239-365. 
Papakonstantinou, G. 2016. Game Over, 3rd edition, Athens: Papadopoulos editions (in 
Greek). 
Papandreou, G. 2015. “Reflections on the Greek and Eurozone Crisis: A View from the 
Inside” in G. Karyotis and R. Gerodimos (eds.), The Politics of Extreme Austerity: 
Greece in the Eurozone Crisis, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 240-258. 
Rori, L. 2016. “The 2015 Greek Parliamentary Elections: From Great Expectations to 
No Expectations” West European Politics 39. 6: 1323-1343. 
Shu, Min. 2008. “Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the 
EU”. European Law Journal 14: 423–45. 
Sternberg, C., Gartzou-Katsouyanni, K., Nicolaidis, K. 2018. The Greco-German Affair 
in the Euro Crisis: Mutual Recognition Lost? Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Stiglitz, J. 2015. “How I would vote in the Greek referendum?”, The Guardian available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/29/joseph-stiglitz-how-i-would-
vote-in-the-greek-referendum 
Tsatsanis, E. and Teperoglou, E. 2016. “Realignment under Stress: The July 2015 
Referendum and the September Parliamentary Election in Greece”, South European 
Society and Politics, 21. 4: 427-450. 
Varoufakis, Y. 2017. Ανίκητοι Ηττημένοι (Adults in the Room) 3rd edition. Athens: 
Patakis editions. 
de Vreese, C. 2007. The dynamics of referendums campaigns: An international 
perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
28 
 
de Vreese, C. and Boomgaarden, H. 2005. “Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of 
Immigration and Support for European Integration”, European Union Politics 6(1): 59-
82 . Walter, S., Dinas, E., Jurado, I. and Konstantinidis, N. 2018. “Non-cooperation by 
Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek 
Bailout Referendum” International Organization (forthcoming). 
List of interviews 
(1) Interview 1, Greek Government Minister, Athens, 1/12/17 
(2) Interview 2, Head of the Office of the Minister of the Greek Government, Athens, 
7/12/17 
(3) Interview 3, Greek Government Minister, Athens, 5/1/18 
(4) Interview 4, Greek Government General Secretary, Athens, 9/1/18 
(5) Interview 5, Greek Government General Secretary, Athens, 16/1/18 
(6) Interview 6, European Commission official, Brussels, 30/1/18 
(7) Interview 7, Greek Government Minister, Athens, 21/3/18 
(8) Interview 8, former Greek Government Minister, Athens, 26/5/18 
(9) Interview 9, European Central Bank official, Skype 30/5/18 
(10)Interview 10, Greek Government Minister, Athens, 31/5/18 
 
 
